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ABSTRACT Despite the growing interest in the study of de facto states, our understanding of the
conditions under which these entities construct and change strategies to gain international
recognition remains partial. The aim of this article is to answer the following questions: firstly,
what strategies did the Kurdistan Region of Iraq adopt in its pursuit of international recognition?
And secondly, what internal and external dynamics are responsible for changing these recognition
strategies? To do so, we analyse 68 speeches, interviews and statements from former KRI
President Masoud Barzani, from the public announcement of an independence referendum on 7
June 2017 to the holding of the referendum on 25 September 2017, looking into his arguments for
independence and how internal and external dynamics have shaped the KRI’s recognition
strategies. Drawing on the case of the KRI, the article tries to provide insights into how de facto
states construct their arguments for statehood.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, under conditions of de facto statehood the Kurdistan Region-
Iraq1 (KRI) has pursued different strategies to gain recognition as an independent state.
It has made claims to independence based on the right of self-determination, the experience
of genocides and gross human rights violations under Saddam Hussein’s regime in the
1980s, its alleged success in creating a democratic and functioning entity from 2003 to
2014 (Voller, 2014), and recently, as this research analyses, on the administrative failure
of the central government of Iraq in ensuring the rights of the KRI (see Table 1).
Since 2014, several radical political transformations have affected the de facto statehood
of Iraqi Kurdistan, culminating in the 25 September 2017 independence referendum. On
this day, eligible voters from the Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Halabja governorates,
and KRI-controlled areas of the Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh governorates, voted either
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‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question: ‘Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas
outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state?’ Despite a low
turnout in the governorates of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja,2 an overwhelming 92.73%
majority voted for ‘yes’. The KRI’s referendum has made Kurdish statehood an inter-
national issue (Cockburn, 2017); however, the unilateral referendum backfired, with
many negative consequences for the entity. The reaction to the referendum highlights
broad international consensus against creating new states in the region, with arguments
based on stability and legality. The expulsion of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk and other dis-
puted territories in October 2017, threatened the gains of the previous twenty-five years,
and importantly, Iraqi Kurdistan’s existence as a de facto entity. Nonetheless, few academic
studies have examined why the political leadership in the KRI changed its strategy in their
pursuit of international recognition, and what internal and external dynamics are respon-
sible for explaining the strategies.
To answer these questions, this article analyses 68 speeches, interviews and statements in
Kurdish, English and Arabic from former KRI President Masoud Barzani (2005–2017) on
Kurdistan’s independence referendum, from 7 June 2017 when the date for the referendum
was set, to the holding of the referendum on 25 September 2017. In a visit to Barzani’s
office in Pirmam, Erbil on 21 January 2018, transcripts of Barzani’s campaign speeches
were collected. In addition, the study relied on the Kurdistan Region Presidency website
for the briefs of Barzani’s private meetings with officials and diplomats (see Appendix
A). Using these documents, Barzani’s arguments for independence, the construction of
the arguments, and how internal and external dynamics influenced them, were analysed.
Barzani was the driving force behind the referendum, and the first who officially called
for the referendum in June 2014 (see ‘Iraq Kurdistan Independence Referendum
Planned,’ 2014). Thus, to analyse the KRI narratives and strategies to gain support for
the Kurdish quest for statehood, it is critical to analyse Barzani’s arguments for indepen-
dence. This analysis is complemented by the researchers’ personal observations and
Table 1. Rhetoric surrounding KRI’s recognition (2003–2017)
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experiences in attending to key events where Barzani and the KRI officials presented their
arguments for independence during the referendum campaign in Erbil in summer 2017.
Through an analysis to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, this article provides insights into the
internal and external dynamics that de facto states face in adopting their recognition strat-
egies—a point around which the literature has not paid enough attention, as argued by Cas-
persen (2015a). In addition, the article explores under what conditions aspiring states
change their recognition strategies, and how the de facto state authorities use different argu-
ments to gain recognition in addressing both internal and external audiences. To understand
the changes that have taken place over the past two decades in de facto states’ strategies of
recognition, we argue that it is crucial to reassess internal dynamics of these entities together
with external ones. By combining the two, this article contributes to the literature by
arguing that internal dynamics are as important as external dynamics, when de facto
states construct and prioritise certain strategies to gain international recognition. The
outline of this article is as follows. The next section introduces strategies pursued by de
facto entities to gain recognition over the past two decades. Then the article offers a
brief background on the development of Kurdistan’s de facto statehood from 1991 to
2017, which is instrumental in understanding the evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan and its rec-
ognition strategies. In the following sections, we examine the KRI’s recognition strategies
through analysing Barzani’s campaign speeches surrounding the 2017 September referen-
dum, and evaluate them in relation to internal and external dynamics that contributed to a
changing strategy for recognition. In conclusion, the article argues that the main strategy
adopted by the KRI for gaining international support combined a claim on failure of part-
nership and power sharing arrangements with the central government of Iraq, with a claim
to national self-determination based on past grievances. This new strategy represents a sig-
nificant shift from Kurdistan’s previous strategy of ‘earned sovereignty’ based on alleged
success in democratisation and state-building to demonstrate its right as an independent
state.
Studying Recognition Strategies
Within the discipline of International Relations, there has been an increasing interest in ana-
lysing de facto states and to distinguish these ‘anomalies’ from other forms of statelessness:
non-state actors, and separatist and secessionist movements. However, the theoretical dis-
cussion is still in its nascent stages (Gürbey, Hofmann, & Syder, 2017, p. 4), and a deeper
understanding of de facto states’ dynamics can be gained through novel case studies. To
conceptualise entities that have managed to achieve degree of statehood in the absence
of international legal recognition, a plethora of terms have been used: ‘de facto states’ (Bart-
mann, 2004; Florea, 2014; Lynch, 2004; Pegg, 1998; Voller, 2014); ‘contested states’ (Gel-
denhuys, 2009; Ker-Lindsay, 2015); ‘unrecognized states’ (Caspersen, 2012); ‘quasi-states’
(Kolstø, 2006); ‘states-within-states’ (Kingston & Spears, 2004); and ‘state-like entities’
(King, 2001). All these classifications point to a condition in the continuum between
formal recognised statehood and other forms of statelessness. This article adopts a defi-
nition of de facto states as entities that meet normal criteria for statehood, but lack inter-
national legal recognition. In the words of Pegg (1998, p. 26), de facto states derive from
organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indi-
genous capability, receives popular support, has achieved sufficient capacity to
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provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area over
which effective control is maintained, views itself as capable of entering into relations
with other states, and seeks widespread international recognition as a sovereign state.
Caspersen in her seminal book Unrecognized States expands on this, identifying five
characteristics for an entity to be considered a de facto state: (1) the entity in question
has achieved de facto independence and controls the majority of the territory it claims,
(2) building state institutions accompanied by attempts to increase external and internal
legitimacy, (3) a declaration of formal independence or at least clearly demonstrated aspira-
tions for independence, for example through an independence referendum, (4) the entity has
not gained international recognition, and (5) the entity has existed for at least two years
(2012, p. 11). The literature shows that there is significant variation in the degree of state-
hood achieved by de facto entities (Caspersen, 2012). Based on the degree of the above cri-
teria achieved by Iraqi Kurdistan over the past two decades, scholars like Harvey and
Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012), Voller (2014), Gunter (2014), MacQueen (2015),
Jüde (2017) and Richards and Smith (2015) categorised Kurdistan and the political
nature of its polity among a group of de facto states.
While the de facto state literature shows that the lack of international recognition does not
consign de facto states to pariah status (see Caspersen, 2012), the current international order
places a great deal of importance on recognition as a condition for sovereign statehood
(Florea, 2017, p. 337). Therefore, de facto states not only aim to maintain their de facto
independence, but they also pursue different strategies to achieve international recognition
(Caspersen, 2012, p. 106), which remains their ultimate goal (Richards & Smith, 2015,
p. 1717). Since the survival of de facto statehood is not guaranteed, leaders of these entities
need to determine how they can maintain their status when the conditions do not grant space
for de jure statehood. While seeking ‘recognition remains an existential issue for de facto
states’ (Caspersen, 2015a, p. 398), still little is known about recognition strategies (Casper-
sen, 2015a, p. 393). Very little research exists on how and when the leaders of these entities
decide to change their recognition strategies.
To gain international recognition, the de facto states authorities have relied on different
arguments and strategies, which can be grouped around three claims: self-determination,
based on national identity, historical continuity, and past grievances; remedial secession,
based on alleged human rights violations; and earned sovereignty, based on the creation
of effective, legitimate and democratic entities. These strategies and claims ‘are continu-
ously being refined and renegotiated in view of changes in the international norms and prac-
tice of recognition’ (Caspersen, 2012, p. 68). Since the late 1990s, there has been a gradual
change from claims based on national identity and past grievances, to claims related to the
effectiveness and democratic nature of the entities, therefore being worthy of state recog-
nition (Caspersen, 2012; Richards, 2014; Voller, 2014). In the post-Cold War era, the intro-
duction of a new set of moral norms (such as respect for human rights, protection of
minorities, and democracy) have determined whether an entity should be recognised as a
state, and thus have also determined practices and strategies for recognition and legitima-
tion (Ryngaert & Sobrie, 2011). Earned sovereignty has become ‘a valuable ticket of admis-
sion into the international arena’ (Florea, 2017, p. 342). One of the main important
consequences of the post-Cold War’s new normative criteria of statehood, as mentioned
above, has been the emphasis on the internal functions and organisation of de facto
states. In this struggle for status and recognition, de facto states not only face external
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pressures, but also significant internal constraints, as the struggle for statehood serves to
legitimise the leadership and popular mobilisation (see Caspersen, 2012). In examining
the strategies adopted by Somaliland, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, and
Taiwan to gain international recognition, Caspersen (2015a, p. 407) finds that
the claims made by aspiring states do not directly mirror changes in the practice of
state recognition and the normative criteria applied. These strategies are subject to
important internal and external constraints, and this explains the considerable
degree of continuity observed.
The changes that occurred in recognition and legitimation practices in the 1990s and the
2000s made democratisation a central element in de facto states’ arguments for statehood
(Broers, 2013; Pegg, 2017). The ‘standards before status’ policy for Kosovo’s recognition
created a perception among the leaders of de facto states that by creating democratic and
effecting entities along international normative standards of statehood, they could gain
international recognition. However, the lack of achievement of such standards did not
prevent Kosovo from achieving recognition. This policy was replaced by ‘status before
standards’ (Caspersen, 2015a, p. 397). This has complicated existing uncertainties over rec-
ognition strategies. As a result, the normative conditionality for statehood that had been
introduced in the 1990s appeared to have given way to another strategy: great-power poli-
tics and support. A new trend to ensure great-power support among aspiring states is on the
rise. As Caspersen (2015b, p. 189) observes, ‘Kosovo’s recognition was to a large extent
dependent on US support, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia would never have been
(partially) recognised had it not been for the role of Russia.’
Background to Iraqi Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood
After the ashes of the 1991 Gulf War, an uprising broke out in northern Iraq. In response to
Saddam Hussein’s retaliatory massacres against the uprising, resulting in the displacement
of hundreds of thousands of the Iraqi Kurds, the US-led Multi-National Forces launched
Operation Provide Comfort to defend civilians attempting to flee. When the UN enacted
Security Council Resolution 688, and the US, the UK and France began enforcing a no-
fly zone north of the 36th parallel in April 1991, Baghdad’s authority in Iraqi Kurdistan
almost vanished. Ba’ath Party administrators and military forces withdrew from the
Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates in October 1991. The Iraqi Kurds took
this opportunity to elect their first parliament and government in 1992, and have been effec-
tively autonomous ever since, with increasing de facto recognition. The Kurdistani Front3
leaders decided to hold a general election in May 1992 in order to attain domestic legiti-
macy, fill the administrative vacuum left by the Saddam regime, settle disputes between
different political parties, and importantly, attract the international community by
holding elections along internationally accepted lines (Bengio, 2012, p. 202; Voller,
2014, p. 71). However, the new social and political structures of Iraqi Kurdistan were
not ready for competitive politics and hard-fought elections. Above all, the political
parties did not have the experience in governing cities. As the Secretary General of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, stated, ‘we came from the mountains,
we were trained as fighters, and now we had to run cities’ (Stansfield, 2003, p. 123). The
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gained a slight advantage over PUK with 51% of votes
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opposed to 49%. The two agreed to a 50:50 division of seats in order to administer jointly
the autonomous region. The 50:50 system prevented the outbreak of fighting, but when a
balance of power between the two changed, the system increased the risk for a decline
into confrontation. Kurdistan had a very difficult inception, which is still impacting its
development. In 1994, fighting between the KDP and PUK erupted due to a residue of
past animosity dating back to the 1960s, disputes over land rights, conflict over revenues
and disagreements over the 1992 election results (Ahmed, 2012; Stansfield, 2003). In
1998, the US brokered the Washington Agreement to end the civil war, which created
two separate administrations in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah. The Washington Agreement
was critical in ending the fighting, but the emergence of two administrations constrained
the subsequent democratisation and state-building processes. As Caspersen (2012, p. 81)
argues, ‘Kurdistan overcame threats to its internal stability through the institutionalization
of divisions.’
The US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq gave the Kurdish leaders an opportunity to unify the
two administrations. From 2003 to 2014, the main strategy adopted by the Kurdish leader-
ship aimed to improve the status quo, benefiting from the participation in rebuilding the new
Iraq, and ensuring greater access to the international system through Baghdad. KRI’s two
major parties, played kingmaker in Baghdad, and occupied the posts of president, minister
of foreign affairs, and other key positions. They also played a major role in bringing the
constitution to fruition in 2005. The new constitution recognises the Kurdistan Region as
the only federal region within Iraq’s borders replete with protected privileges, including
control over security forces, economy and body of law independent from that of the gov-
ernment of Iraq, as per Section 5, Article 117. These, further, should not contradict the Iraqi
constitution. Kurdistan became more stable, particularly as a result of the ‘Unification
Accord’ between the KDP and PUK that came into effect in 2006 when a coalition govern-
ment of unity replaced the previous two administrations. While unification progressed a
great deal during this time, it has eventually failed to unify and institutionalise the key min-
istries of finance, Peshmerga, the interior and intelligence agencies. In other words, despite
the development of the government institutions, the centre of power has remained outside
the reach of the government. Nevertheless, during this period the new power sharing agree-
ment at the top level enabled Erbil to speak with one voice to Baghdad.
In addition, the constitution allocates 17% of the national budget to the KRI, based on
population percentages. From 2005 to 2013, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
budget increased from about $2.5 billion to $13 billion (Natali, 2015, p. 147). With oil
prices at their peak between 2012 and 2013, Erbil experienced an unprecedented economic
boom, with annual growth rates amounting to 12% (‘Determined to Grow,’ 2013). The
abovementioned events greatly shaped the power configuration between Baghdad and
Erbil. Although Kurdistan emerged as a de facto state before 2003, it was in the post-
2003 period that the entity came into being for its population. The context of non-recog-
nition, as argued by Richards and Smith (2015), played a positive role in the development
of state-building in this period. The Kurdish leaders used the dysfunctional Iraqi govern-
ment to increase their de facto powers, and began presenting the region as ‘the Other
Iraq’ or as an ‘island of stability’, therefore strengthening Kurdistan’s claim for inter-
national recognition. This, together with the emphasis put on the effectiveness of the
entity, became an important argument in the efforts of the Kurdish leadership for gaining
support for the Kurdish quest for statehood. In addition, in the first decade after 2003 the
prospect of democracy was also high compared to other phases. Between 2003 and
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2015, many considered the KRI’s democratisation attempts as a good example of democ-
racy in Iraq, in terms of relatively fair elections, rights for religious and ethnic minorities,
women rights, and emerging active opposition in parliament. During this period, the
Kurdish leaders started emphasising the entity’s alleged success in democratisation and
state-building, and these claims came to dominate Kurdistan’s external legitimation strat-
egy. However, despite Kurdistan witnessing positive developments in terms of democracy
and state-building compared to the rest of Iraq, its democratic development has by no means
been linear. In addition to an effort to consolidate the KDP and PUK’s power over KRI
especially after 2005 (MacQueen, 2015, p. 430), democratisation was notably driven by dif-
ferentiating itself from the government in Baghdad. It has failed to strengthen the core of
democratic institutions and institutionalise security and Peshmerga forces. The KRI’s
2015 democratic deficit, as explained below, is a manifestation of this reality.
Iraqi Kurdistan’s emphasis on effective governance was also combined with efforts to
attract the regional and great-power support. Erbil’s strategy to develop its oil and gas
sector served the region’s purpose of becoming economically independent from Baghdad
(Stansfield, 2014, p. 4). In addition, the KDP and PUK benefit from wealth coming from
oil for patronage and consolidation of their power (Mills, 2016, p. 41). As a result, Kurdi-
stan has become ‘one of the most active areas for onshore oil and gas exploration in recent
years’ (Mills, 2016, p. 17). Attracting international oil companies like ExxonMobil,
Rosneft, Chevron Total and Gazprom Neft in 2012, became a game-changing move (Stans-
field, 2013, p. 273), with major political implications for Kurdistan’s independence (Mills,
2016, p. 1). This development was significantly driven by the perception that, for gaining
international recognition, the KRI needed to attract the interests of the great powers. More-
over, involving the international oil and gas companies might, it was believed, deter
Baghdad and other neighbouring countries from taking punitive measures against the KRI.
A Change in Recognition Strategies
After 2003, a weak Baghdad looked with greater suspicion at the consolidation of Kurdistan’s
de facto autonomy. The weakness of the Iraqi government was one of the most important
factors in the consolidation of Kurdistan after the regime change. Since the start of the era
of Nouri al-Maliki, especially in his second term (2010–2014), serious disagreements
between Erbil and Baghdad over different issues, such as status of the Peshmerga, revenue
sharing, oil exportation and disputed territories, emerged. It was within this period that for
the first time after 2003, the KRI leaders, mainly Barzani, introduced the idea of independence
as a solution to the Erbil-Baghdad disputes (see Van Wilgenburg, 2012). In response to
Erbil’s push towards increased de facto independence, al-Maliki started imposing punitive
military, political and economic measures on the KRI, such as deploying Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF)/Dijla forces to Kirkuk to assert Baghdad’s control in November 2012, with
enduring and severe implications for future Baghdad-Erbil relations. Furthermore, the PM
directed the Iraqi Ministry of Finance to cease paying the KRG’s 17% national budget in
2014, accusing the KRG of not delivering the agreed amount of oil to the State Organisation
for Marketing of Oil (Nader, Scotten, Allen, & Hanauer, 2016, p. 42). These changes aggra-
vated pre-existing tensions between the two governments causing the parties to revert to a
degree of Saddam-era distrust and acrimony.
The collapse of ISF in northern Iraq in mid-2014 as Islamic State (IS) advanced, created
an opportunity for Kurdistan to expand its territory. As soon as ISF left these areas in June
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2014, Barzani ordered the deployment of Peshmerga to hold Kirkuk, Tuz Khrumatu, the
Mosul Plain, Makhmoor, Shingal and other areas situated along the contested border
between KRI and Federal Iraq. Following these events, Barzani surprisingly claimed that
Article 140 of the constitution, which is designed to settle territorial disputes between
Erbil and Baghdad, ‘has been implemented and completed for us’ (‘Kurdistan’s
Barzani,’ 2014). More than ever, the Peshmerga’s ability to succeed where ISF failed to
stymie IS’ advances, was pivotal to enhancing Erbil’s political leverage with Baghdad.
Based on the newly acquired control over a territory 50% larger than the Kurdistan
Region’s official size, and sure of its celebrated military strength, the political climate
for independence appeared ripe. Thus, on 3 July 2014, Barzani instructed the KRI Parlia-
ment to begin preparations for the independence referendum. Then on 7 July of that year he
announced that ‘from now on, we will not hide the fact that independence is our goal’ (‘Iraq
Kurdistan Independence Referendum Planned,’ 2014).
While the advance of IS presented an opportunity for Iraqi Kurdistan, it also brought new
challenges beyond the capacity of Erbil’s security and military forces. IS was heading
towards Baghdad, and the Erbil leadership was focusing on independence rather than con-
cerning themselves with potential attacks from IS. On 7 August of that year, IS militants
advanced as close as 25 miles from the KRI’s capital, before US President Barack
Obama ordered airstrikes against IS to drive them out of KRI-controlled territory. More-
over, the 2014 drop in oil prices and Baghdad’s decision to freeze the share of the KRI
budget, costing the entity nearly one billion dollars a month (Khateeb & Mehdi, 2014),
financing the war against IS, the influx of 250,000 Syrian refugees and 1.5 million intern-
ally displaced populations, overwhelmed Kurdistan with a severe financial crisis. In com-
bination, these challenges forced Erbil to postpone the calls for a referendum, yet it kept it
as its declared goal.
Despite the aforementioned challenges, Iraqi Kurdistan maintained its position towards
independence in different ways (Stansfield, 2017). Becoming a crucial strategic member
of the Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD), Erbil not only acquired military leverage
(see Charountaki, 2018; Kaplan, 2019), but also gained the ability to conduct cross-
border activities. For example, in October 2014, Peshmerga for the first time in its
history officially crossed the border, when Erbil secured Ankara and Washington’s agree-
ment to send support to assist the defence of Kobanê (a Kurdish city in northern Syria)
from IS in Syria; deploying Peshmerga to another country without the permission of the
Iraqi government, is against Iraq’s constitution. Interestingly, the deployment was part of
GCD, showing Kurdistan’s de facto engagement. To protect these gains, Barzani blazed
ahead with referendum plans. Barzani had to move fast to run the referendum, consider-
ing important developments such as the approaching end of his term in office (discussed
below)4 and the scaling down of the war against IS as the Mosul operations were con-
cluding and Peshmerga retook all areas claimed by Erbil by summer 2017. Barzani
believed that in this new era Peshmerga was no longer needed, and a move like the refer-
endum was viewed as a necessary step to protect the achievements of Peshmerga in the
2014–2017 period.
The Failure of Partnership with Baghdad: A New Strategy
During the period 2014–2017, Kurdistan’s legitimation strategy shifted from emphasising
democratisation and state-building, to claiming the failure of the partnership with
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Baghdad. An integral part of this argument was to emphasise the negative aspects of
Baghdad, rather stressing the positive aspects of Kurdistan. The referendum campaign
began with the claim based on Baghdad’s failure to embrace the constitutional
demands of Kurdistan. In addition to claiming that Baghdad had failed to uphold its
social and constitutional contract with KRI, Barzani also referred to history as the ration-
ale behind Kurdistan’s independence project. The date of the referendum was set on 7
June 2017, a day after Barzani issued a presidential decree (No. 106) explaining as fol-
lowing the reasons for the referendum:
Due to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi political leadership’s exclusive policies,
violations of the constitution, and ignoring the rights and demands of the people of
Kurdistan […] we reach the conclusion that we have to return to our people’s
opinion and will, and let them decide on their future. (Kurdistan Region Presidency,
2017)
Barzani’s speeches and arguments for independence (see Appendix A) were shaped by
examples deriving from Kurdish history in Iraq, still relevant, informing politics and
decisions in the country. He divided the Kurdish-Iraqi government relations into two his-
torical phases: the first phase, spanning from the post-First World War era and the foun-
dation of the Kingdom of Iraq under British Administration in 1920, to the regime
change in 2003; and the second from 2003 to 2017. Barzani argued that these two
phases were similar, with the policies of genocide, denial and racial oppression in the
first phase, and the refusal of partnership in the second phase. He also believed that
while the regime may have changed in 2003, the mind-set of Baghdad’s political class
had not changed (‘Exclusive: “No turning back” on independence vote,’ 2017). This
notion can be illustrated in the following quotes:
No crime was worse than the crime when Baghdad cut the source of living for the
population of Kurdistan, including the milk of children. That is a crime no less
than the chemical bombardment and the Anfal. (Barzani, 2017c)
After the IS war, Baghdad wants us to go back to the green line [referring to the line
that separated Peshmerga from the army of Saddam before 2003], in order to attack
Erbil with mortars […] The culture of resorting to military force to resolve the
Kurdish issue has not changed in Baghdad, after decades of genocide against
Kurds at the hands of the Iraqi government. (Barzani, 2017e)
During the IS war, we did not receive any economic or military assistance from Iraq
[…] Now, we have come to the conclusion that we are not welcome and not accepted
as citizens and real partners […] After sacrifices we made for the sake of building a
democratic Iraq, now it is time for the Kurds to protect their dignity, and reject sub-
ordination and oppression […] Therefore, our friends in Baghdad should be blamed,
not us, because they are the ones who pushed us towards holding the independence
referendum. (Barzani, 2017d)
However, the problem with this claim is that despite the failures of the post-2003 Iraq
governments, the new Iraq cannot be compared to Saddam’s Iraq. Such an interpretation
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of history and politics in Iraq, was needed to convince the public that the future would
remain the same, and thus the timing of the referendum was appropriate despite the argu-
ments to the contrary. This argument did not gain support for the right to remedial seces-
sion, as the historical genocides and crimes against the Kurds, such as the 1988 Halabja
chemical attack, and the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, were committed by the
Saddam regime, not the post-2003 governments in Baghdad. The KRI leadership knew
that this claim to self-determination, grounded in past grievances and human rights viola-
tions, could not stand alone, and therefore needed to be bolstered by other claims. Never-
theless, neither could a unilateral referendum based only on the claim of the administrative
failure of the Iraqi government in ensuring the rights of Kurdish citizens, could not provide
a threshold for invoking remedial secession (Srihari, 2018).
While history drove Barzani’s move towards independence, Kurdistan’s arguments were
not merely based on past grievances and victimhood. The 1920–2003 history served as a
supporting argument to the Kurdish leaders’ argument of the failure of constitutional and
power-sharing arrangements in the post-2003 Iraq. For Kurdistan’s political actors, the
removal of the Saddam regime meant the beginning of a new Iraq in which partnership
was meant to be the basis of the new state. Nevertheless, Barzani did not describe the par-
ticipation of Kurdistan in the new Iraq as reintegration or unification, but as a voluntary
union which could be, in turn, voluntarily dissolved. ‘We voluntarily went to Baghdad,’
Barzani insisted, ‘we were not prisoners of war in order for them to impose their conditions
on us’ (Barzani, 2017e). His point was that this voluntarily union had failed and, impor-
tantly, was a mistake in the first place.
In 2003, Kurdistan was an independent state. We went to Baghdad to create a demo-
cratic and federal Iraq […] Now I am acknowledging that in 2003, we made a big
mistake when we went to Baghdad with a good heart and goodwill […] They did
not accept partnership, and now they should not blame us […] We are voluntarily
leaving it. (Barzani, 2017g)
When the KRI authorities define partnership, they refer to the status of Kurdistan as an
independent de facto state before 2003, ‘The Kurdistan Regional Government has exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over the territory of Kurdistan, maintained a separate military [Pesh-
merga], and controlled Kurdistan’s external borders’ (KRG, 2017). What’s more, partner-
ship for the Kurdish leaders also meant ‘balance’ and ‘consensus’ between the three
components of Iraq, Arab Shia, Arab Sunni and Kurd. Barzani viewed the increasing
calls for a majority government in Baghdad (in favour of the Shia parties) as a threat to
the principle of the partnership and the future of the Kurds in Iraq (Barzani, 2017b).
However, all post-2003 governments, including the current one, were formed by the partici-
pation of all major parties, including Kurdistan’s two main parties the KDP and PUK.
Essentially, this system centred on a consensual power-sharing arrangement among the
country’s three ethno-sectarian groups, the Arab Shia, the Arab Sunni and the Kurds,
leaving little space for a majority government. According to this informal system of
power-sharing in Iraq, the prime minister’s post is held by an Arab Shia, an Arab Sunni
is speaker of parliament, and a Kurd holds the presidency. This might be justified to
prevent exclusion, but has also contributed to political Muhas’asa (Arabic for confession-
alism), resulted in fragmenting state institutions, and the division of resources between pol-
itical parties.
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Baghdad’s Constitutional Violations: Another Argument for Independence
Another element in Barzani’s speeches was putting the blame on Bagdad for violating the
constitution:
It is a shame for them to talk about the constitution. Every step they took was in vio-
lation of the constitution. (Barzani, 2017f)
Which article of the constitution gave you the right to cut the bread of the people of
Kurdistan? Which article gave you the right to violate and ignore Article 140?
(Barzani, 2017f)
Those [Iraqi officials] who question the constitutionality of the referendum should
first read the constitution carefully. The constitution’s charter clearly stipulates that
adherence to the constitution is the guarantor of the unity of Iraq. The question
here is, have they implemented the constitution? (Barzani, 2017b)
We have tried all other alternatives to independence, but none of them worked. Now,
we consider the independence of Kurdistan a solution to the problems, a cure for our
pain. Iraq’s lack of commitment to the constitution, and its wrong policies, are what
have threatened the unity of Iraq. (Barzani, 2017c)
In line with this argument, KRG issued an extensive report submitting its arguments on
why Kurdistan should have independence. It based its claims on the constitutional right of
Kurdistan to achieve international recognition. The report shows that Baghdad violated 55
Articles of the constitution’s 114 Articles, and that another 12 Articles were not fulfilled or
implemented (KRG, 2017). This argument was also consistently used by other pro-referen-
dum figures and parties, such as Kosrat Rasul, the Secretary General of PUK; Najmadin
Karim, the Governor of Kirkuk at the time; Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaaddin, the Sec-
retary-General of the Islamic Union; and Muhammad Haji Mahmoud, head of the Kurdistan
Socialist Party. It is true that the ambiguities of the constitution, and the different interpret-
ations of what the central government is required to provide KRG, have led to disagree-
ments between Baghdad and Erbil (see Nader et al., 2016), but the core of the issue is
the lack of trust and the existence of two different visions. Despite Erbil’s criticisms regard-
ing Baghdad’s unwillingness to implement the constitution, especially Article 140, Kurdi-
stan has long been exercising some of its key powers beyond the limits granted by the
constitution. For example, Erbil is still exerting full control over borders with Turkey
and Iran, and has its own visa regime separate from Baghdad. While Peshmerga is
legally part of the Iraqi security forces, on the ground it acts as the army of Kurdistan.
Such practices and procedures are not constitutional, but are functions of the KRI’s de
facto status.
The Uncertainty of the Status Quo
Kurdistan consolidated its de facto statehood by maintaining and improving the status quo
for more than a decade, but the status quo has always been subject to both internal and
external constraints. The ambiguous status of Kurdistan was not the most fundamental
factor determining Erbil’s decision to hold the referendum; nonetheless, it contributed to
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a general sense of prevailing uncertainty. This sense of uncertainty also contributed to the
feeling that ‘the Kurds have no future within Iraq.’ In one of the meetings with religious
scholars in Erbil on August 9, Barzani showed that he is unconvinced that KRI’s future
and security will be guaranteed by the status quo.
Shall we keep living in uncertainty, in a condition where we do not know when we
will be attacked […] I swear by God if I am certain about the status quo, then we
would leave the project of independence for a future generation […] but I am
afraid, and I am certain, that when the IS war is over, Baghdad will come and
demand us to leave Khanaqin, Kirkuk, Shingal and Makhmoor, and tell us that we
must go back to the 2003 border. (Barzani, 2017e)
Despite this claim, the pre-referendum status quo was the highest level of de facto
independence the entity had ever achieved since 1991, with total control over disputed
territories, and this was largely practically (and tactically) accepted by Baghdad, Tehran,
Ankara, and the international actors from 2014 to 2017. Considering that Kurdistan had
already enjoyed the powers of de facto statehood, the consequences of the negative reac-
tions to the referendum led many Kurds to believe that the referendum had been a bad
idea, and that they should have been content with the powers the entity had previously.
However, in the context of non-recognition, there was no answer to the question of how
to ensure long-term sustainability. Barzani believed that remaining in Iraq was the great-
est threat to the people of Kurdistan, describing it as subordination (Barzani, 2017i). At
the time, Barzani believed that the uncertainty around Kurdistan’s status justified the
referendum. However, the lack of international support for this call created further
uncertainty among the people. When asked about the reactions of Iran and Turkey,
he could not provide clarity and certainty about what would happen the day after the
referendum.
Addressing Internal and External Audiences
Depending on which audience Barzani was appealing to, two different strategies were
dominant. Addressing Baghdad, regional powers and the international community, together
constituted one strategy, whilst addressing the demands and expectations of the internal
audience required the development of separate arguments. From the beginning, the
attempt at pleasing the two audiences created confusion among the local people, because
when Barzani addressed the outside world, he used cautious language with more focus
on dialogue and negotiation with Baghdad. Barzani wrote in a Washington Post opinion
piece on 28 June 2017, that ‘the timing and modalities of our independence will be
subject to negotiation with Baghdad and consultation with our neighbors and the wider
international community’ (Barzani, 2017a). When asked about the reactions of Baghdad,
Barzani responded as follows:
I explained to him [Haider al-Abadi, PM of Iraq, 2014–2018] that this referendum is a
normal, legal right of our people, and that afterwards we want negotiate the results of
the referendum in a peaceful way through dialogue. He had an understanding of that
[…] He was receptive and understanding. (MacDiarmid, 2017)
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In addressing the international community, Barzani included the emphasis on Kurdistan as
a factor of stability in the region.
In the past 25 years we have proven that we are not a threat to any country, we are
friends and a factor for stability in the region and we will continue to be so, and
we will respect the principles of the international law. (Barzani, 2017j)
As the speeches analysed for this article show, Barzani did not directly address audiences
Iraq, Iran and Turkey despite their influence and leverage on the issue. He primarily
addressed audiences in Western and Arab countries. When addressing the Western media,
Barzani referred to the right to self-determination, the historical injustices, and the Peshmer-
ga’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, and he made promises ensuring that the refer-
endumwill not have a negative impact on the GCD’s achievements (Barzani, 2017a). On the
other hand, in addressing the Arab world, Barzani mainly emphasised the sectarian nature of
the Iraqi state, and Baghdad’s constitutional violations, especially during the era of Maliki
(see Charbel, 2017), perhaps because Maliki is widely seen as a sectarian leader among
Arab Sunni countries. On the domestic front, Barzani focused more on past grievances,
and the belligerent attitude Baghdad continued to have against the Kurds. He delivered
most of his speeches in Erbil and Duhok provinces, with the exclusion of one speech deliv-
ered in Sulaimaniyah (outside of the KDP-controlled territory) and one speech in Kirkuk.
This shows that the referendum campaign mainly concentrated on and was more welcomed
in the KDP-held areas of Erbil and Duhok, compared to the PUK- and Gorran (the Change
Movement)-held areas of Sulaimaniyah,Garmian andHalabja. The referendumbeing seen as
a KDP project, appeared to be the most significant reason for the low turnout in these areas.
There was fear and uncertainty among the people about the outcomes of the referendum,
and until the last days before the referendum many people had doubts about the sincerity of
the call. For this reason, he initially argued that the international community did not reject
the idea of the referendum, but only had objections about the timing. He also rejected any
possibility of Iranian or Turkish military intervention, or armed confrontation with the Iraqi
forces. However, when the official campaign for the referendum began on 5 September,
Barzani’s speeches became more consistent, straightforward and tough. Unlike in his
Washington Post piece, Barzani now claimed that ‘the date of voting is the date of declaring
independence. If possible, we will declare independence before Newroz [March 2018]. If
possible, we will do it even earlier’ (Barzani, 2017g). In response to the countries that
opposed the vote and its timing, Barzani said
it is the people of Kurdistan who will give legitimacy to the referendum, not the out-
siders […] We thought that in reward to the sacrifice of Peshmerga who broke the
myth of IS—they would say that you the people of Kurdistan, independence is
your right. Since they do not take our sacrifices into consideration, we do not take
theirs either, not even a bit. (Barzani, 2017h)
The Diminishing Importance of the ‘Earned Sovereignty’ Strategy
For years, the attempt to create an entity that was deemed internationally acceptable, there-
fore worthy of recognition and support, significantly impacted Kurdistan’s development of
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de facto statehood. Voller (2014) argues that the pursuit of legitimacy based on its success
in state-building, governance and democratisation, has been a defining feature of Kurdi-
stan’s de facto statehood and its legitimation strategy. However, since 2015, the democra-
tisation process in Erbil has been complicated by the dispute over Barzani’s presidency.
Barzani’s term in office should have ended in 2013, after serving two four-year terms,
but his tenure was extended for two additional years. This extension was made possible
through a parliamentary law issued by the KDP and PUK. A second extension by the Con-
sultative Council took place in 2015 for two more years after the political parties failed to
reach a negotiated solution on Barzani’s presidency. As the political parties failed to reach
an agreement before the August 19 deadline, Barzani continued to remain as the president
beyond his term limit, despite the protests of other parties, notably Gorran. In October 2015,
KRI saw a brief spell of violent demonstrations over delayed salaries and the ongoing
dispute on Barzani’s presidency. The crackdown on demonstrations significantly affected
the political process in Kurdistan. KDP accused Gorran of inciting the demonstrators
against it in the Sulaymaniyah province. The conflict resulted in a reshuffle of the
KRG’s coalition government. On 12 October 2015, KDP unilaterally removed four
members of the cabinet from Gorran, and the Parliament Speaker Yusuf Muhammad was
prevented from entering Erbil, where the Parliament is based. As a result, the Parliament
was deactivated and was not convened until September 2017.
The practice, and also the claims, of democratisation, were undermined by the 2015 deac-
tivating of the Parliament and the extension of Barzani’s term. In addition to implications
for the political stability of Kurdistan, the presidential crisis did not allow the Erbil leader-
ship to use Kurdistan’s ‘democratisation’ as an argument for independence. It could no
longer claim that it is more democratic than the government in Baghdad. In fact, the domi-
nant discussion put forward by the pro-referendum block, was that democracy requires
internationally recognised statehood. Asked about internal problems, Barzani (2017g)
described statehood as ‘designing a new house, which you can design as you like, but
first you need [the structure of] a house’. The lack of this ‘house’ constrained attempts to
prioritise democracy in the 2014–2017 period. Not only KDP, but also factions of PUK,
the Islamic Union of Kurdistan and other smaller parties, believed that priority should be
given to seizing the opportunity to gain independence above issues concerning internal
politics and democratisation. This is illustrated in Barzani’s statement in June 2017: ‘If
we wait and wait to solve all of the issues beforehand, and if we wait until the region is
stabilized, we’re probably going to be waiting a long time’ (‘Exclusive: “No turning
back” on independence vote,’ 2017). Similarly, Hoshyar Zebari, former Iraqi Foreign Min-
ister and a member of the KRI High Referendum Council stated: ‘If we wait for all the pro-
blems to be resolved, we will have to wait forever’ (Kent, 2017).
The Peshmerga’s effective role in counterterrorism gained international support for the
Kurds, and replaced Kurdistan’s ‘democracy-for-recognition’ strategy. The lack of inter-
national pressure for democratisation in KRI also contributed to this change. In this
period, the main focus was on the fight against IS, and the GCD’s military support was
not conditioned on democracy or rule of law. The secretary-general of the Kurdistan Social-
ist Democratic Party, Muhammad Haji Mahmoud, confirmed this:
American and British representatives in the meeting both advised us and warned us
[…] They told us this is not the right time to reform, with Kurdistan facing the Islamic
State, and it can’t deal with other issues […] The UK and US representatives told us
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that if Kurds distract themselves with internal issues, they won’t have the support of
the UK and the US in fighting the Islamic State. (‘Kaka Hama,’ 2015)
Looking at the official statements of the US, the UK, the EU, France and the UN on the
referendum, the objections were not based on the condition of democracy in Kurdistan.
They were mainly concerned about the referendum’s impact on the fight against IS and
on the stability of the region. This is illustrated in the following quotes:
The United States has repeatedly emphasized to the leaders of the Kurdistan Regional
Government that the referendum is distracting from efforts to defeat ISIS and stabilize
the liberated areas. (The White House, 2017)
The referendum risks increasing instability in the region when the focus should be on
defeating Daesh. (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017)
[A]ny unilateral decision to hold a referendum at this time would detract from the
need to defeat Da’esh. (UN Secretary-General, 2017)
Although the practice of democracy did not shape the strategy, Barzani consistently
described the referendum as democratic. In the final weeks before the referendum, it
appeared clear that the international community did not support the call for the referendum.
As the following quote shows, he underlined his disappointment with the lack of inter-
national support for the referendum: ‘It was surprising to see the reaction from the inter-
national community. Where is your democracy now? Where are the UN charters? Where
is the respect for freedom of expression?’ (Chulov & Johnson, 2017). In short, in addition
to the lack of international pressure for democratisation, the emphasis on independence and
the unfounded belief that it would be a panacea to address all of Kurdistan’s internal pro-
blems, marginalised the ‘democracy-for-recognition’ strategy.
Conclusion
Despite the unprecedented and extensive international engagement the KRI achieved in the
2014–2017 period, its efforts to achieve international recognition have thus far remained
unsuccessful. In this article, we focused on various external and internal dynamics in con-
structing and changing recognition strategies, rather than just focusing on the international
practices of recognition and statehood. Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto entity long sought to
preserve and improve on the status quo, especially when international recognition was
deemed unobtainable after the 2003 war, as rebuilding Iraq became the main priority of
the US-led coalition. Nevertheless, when there is a perceived opportunity, as an aspiring
state Kurdistan will seek full-fledged statehood, as the 2017 referendum for independence
has shown. From 2014 to 2017, the KRI benefited from the weakness of the Iraqi govern-
ment to increase its international engagement, and the collapse of ISF in the face of IS in
summer 2014 enabled the Erbil authorities to change their recognition strategy from preser-
ving the status quo to seeking independence.
In the 25 September 2017 referendum, the KRI leadership used the failure of partnership
with Baghdad as the main argument to justify Kurdistan’s requirements for international
recognition. The second argument was the right to self-determination, based on national
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identity, historical injustice and past grievances. Since 2014, the KRI has witnessed a shift
from a strategy based on creating a democratic and functioning entity, to the claim of the
failure of constitutional and power sharing arrangements with the government of Iraq,
and the breakdown of the social contract.
In fact, in the years after 2003, the successes of the democratisation and state-building
processes, as explained above, helped to gain international engagement without recog-
nition. This new shift reflects both internal and external dynamics and constraints.
Though victories over IS strengthened KRI’s ability to amass control over greater
swathes of land, the region has not created a viable dynamic to democratisation and effec-
tive governance. Additionally, the 2015 political deadlock was also an inevitable outcome
of two sharply opposing outlooks embedded in the party political struggle, mainly between
KDP and Gorran. Internally, the democratic deficit in 2015 over Barzani’s presidency, com-
plicated democratisation process in the KRI. Externally, the shift also mirrors the lack of
international emphasis on democratisation in the KRI. During this period, the international
community focused more on Kurdistan’s role in countering the threat of IS, and providing
shelter to 1.8 million IDPs and refugees. Importantly, the GCD’s support to Peshmergawas
not conditioned upon democracy, human rights, or the rule of law in Kurdistan. This
emphasise the importance of political considerations for state recognition.
After reflecting on the recognition strategies pursued by the KRI, three notable trends can
be identified. First, Kurdistan’s change of strategy seems to show that when there is an
opportunity to gain international recognition, de facto states are ready to change their
long-pursued status quo strategy, and to defy the international community. Second, the
case of Kurdistan clearly shows that internal dynamics are central to understanding how
and why de facto states construct and change their recognition strategies. This has long
been under-studied in the literature of de facto states. Third, the recognition strategies
adopted by the KRI’s political authority do not correspond to the dominant theoretical argu-
ment in the literature of de facto states, that de facto states seek international recognition
based on their claims to effective and democratic entity.
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Notes
1. The KRI refers to the Kurdish autonomous region that emerged in northern Iraq after the institution of the
No-Fly Zone in 1991. KRI consists of the four provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Halabja, with
a combined population of more than five million, as well as large sections of territory known as the ‘dis-
puted territories’, claimed by both Erbil and Baghdad. Since 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan has developed many
state-like features (from security to visa regulation and border control, among others) that have laid the
foundation for being a de facto state.
2. The KRI’s Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission has not published a breakdown of
numbers per province. According to non-official numbers, turnout was high in the KDP-dominated pro-
vinces of Erbil and Duhok and the disputed province of Kirkuk. However, as the referendum was seen
as a KDP project by many in the PUK-controlled areas of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, the turnout was
low there.
3. The Kurdistani Front was established in 1988 by Kurdish parties to organise opposition against the Saddam
regime.
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4. Barzani’s desire to hold the referendum while he is still in office shows the implications of the presidential
issue for the timing of the referendum. He knew that his tenure would end in 2017 and would not be poss-
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Appendix A. A Complete List of Barzani’s Speeches, Interviews, Meetings and
Statements
1. Barzani’s first statement on setting the date of the referendum. 07 June 2017.
2. Barzani’s meeting with leaders and representatives of the KRI political parties. Sala-
hadin, Erbil, 7 June 2017.
3. Barzani’s Presidential Decree NO. 106. Erbil, 8 June 2017.
4. Barzani’s meeting with leaders and representatives of the KRI political parties. Sala-
hadin, Erbil, 10 June 2017.
5. Barzani’s interview with Foreign Policy. 16 June 2017.
6. Barzani’s meeting with Salim al-Jibouri, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker. Salahadin,
Erbil, 19 June 2017.
7. Barzani’s speech to academics, community and tribal leaders of Nineveh and Makh-
moor. Erbil, 21 June 2017.
8. Barzani’s interview with France24. Salahadin, Erbil, 21 June 2017.
9. Barzani’s op-ed to the Washington Post. On 28 June 2017.
10. Barzani’s meeting with the consuls general of Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. Salahadin, Erbil. 04 July 2017.
11. Barzani’s interview with Reuters. 6 July 2017.
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12. Barzani’s first meeting with the High Referendum Council. Salahadin, Erbil. 8 July
2017.
13. Barzani’s speech to members of the European Union Parliament. Brussels, 11 July
2017.
14. Barzani’s meeting with the Belgium officials and the Minister-President of Flanders
Geert Bourgeois. Brussels, 11 July 2017.
15. Barzani’s public statement. 19 July 2017.
16. Barzani’s meeting with the High Referendum Council. Salahadin, Erbil. 30 July 2017.
17. Barzani’s speech commemorating the 33rd anniversary of the Barzanis’ genocide.
Barzan, Erbil, 31 July 2017.
18. Barzani’s meeting with a delegation of Kuwaiti journalists. Salahadin, Erbil, 3 August
2017.
19. Barzani’s letter to Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Secretary-General of the Arab League. 3
August 2017.
20. Barzani’s statement on the anniversary of the Chaldean, Syriac and Assyrian martyrs’
day. 6 August 2017.
21. Barzani’s speech to Kurdistan’s religious scholars. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 9
August 2017.
22. Barzani’s interview with Al-Hayat newspaper. 9 August 2017.
23. Barzani’s interview with Al-Ahram newspaper. 10 August 2017.
24. Barzani’s telephone conversation with Rex Tillerson, former US Secretary of State. 11
August 2017.
25. Barzani’s statement on the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party. 15 August 2017.
26. Barzani’s meeting with General Joseph Votel, Commander of the US Central
Command. Salahadin, Erbil, 17 August 2017.
27. Barzani’s interview with Okaz newspaper. 10 August 2017.
28. Barzani’s meeting with Irfan Abdulaziz, Leader of the Kurdistan Islamic Movement.
Salahadin, Erbil, 17 August 2017.
29. Barzani’s meeting with Dr. Sultan Abo Orabi, the Secretary General of the Association
of Arab Universities, and Ziad al-Kurdi, President of Irbid National University. Sala-
hadin, Erbil. 19 August 2017.
30. Barzani’s speech to the vocational and professional syndicates. Saad Abdullah Hall,
Erbil, 21 August 2017.
31. Barzani’s speech to students, youth and women activists. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 21
August 2017.
32. Barzani’s meeting with James Mattis, the US Secretary of Defense. Salahadin, Erbil.
22 August 2017.
33. Barzani addressing a gathering of minority groups. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 22
August 2017.
34. Barzani addressing a gathering of Peshmerga veterans, religious and community
figures of Erbil. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 23 August 2017.
35. Barzani’s meeting with Cyril Nann, the German ambassador to Iraq. Salahadin, Erbil.
24 August 2017.
36. Barzani’s meeting with Frank Baker, the United Kingdom ambassador to Iraq. Salaha-
din, Erbil. 24 August 2017.
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37. Barzani’s meeting with Patrick Simonnet, the Ambassador of the European Union to
Iraq. Salahadin, Erbil. 24 August 2017.
38. Barzani’s meeting with Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sal-
ahadin, Erbil. 24 August 2017.
39. Barzani’s meeting with Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Foreign Minister; Florence Parly,
French Defence Minister. Salahadin, Erbil, 26 August 2017.
40. Barzani’s message to the Cologne rally in support of independence. 25 August 2017.
41. Barzani’s interview with Ashraq al-Awsat. 30 August 2017.
42. Barzani’s speech to Kurdistan’s university professors and academics. Saad Abdullah
Hall, Erbil, 30 August 2017.
43. Barzani’s speech to the school teachers. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 30 August 2017.
44. Barzani’s speech to journalists, writers, and artists. Saad Abdullah Hall, Erbil, 06 Sep-
tember 2017.
45. Barzani’s interview with Al Arabiya. 07 September 2017.
46. Barzani’s meeting with Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the General-Secretary of the Arab
League. Salahadin, Erbil, 09 September 2017.
47. Barzani’s statement on the 56th anniversary of Great September Revolution. 10 Sep-
tember 2017.
48. Barzani’s public statement. 10 September 2017.
49. Barzani’s speech to the representatives of the Turkmen, Arab and Kurdish components
of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, 12 September 2017.
50. Barzani’s speech to Akre’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Akre,
Duhok, 13 September 2017.
51. Barzani’s speech in Zakho’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Zakho,
Duhok, 14 September 2017.
52. Barzani’s meeting with the Brett McGurk the US Special Presidential Envoy for the
Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Jan Kubis the
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Iraq, ambassador Douglas Silliman the US ambassador to Iraq, and ambas-
sador Frank Baker, the UK ambassador to Iraq. Duhok, 14 September 2017.
53. Barzani’s speech in Amedi’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Amedi,
Duhok, 15 September 2017.
54. Barzani’s message to the rally of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden. 16 September 2017.
55. Barzani’s message to the rally of the Kurdish diaspora in Belgium. 16 September 2017.
56. Barzani’s meeting with representatives of the components of the Mosul Plain and
Nineveh. Duhok, 16 September 2017.
57. Barzani’s message in the Democracy and the Right to Self-determination Forum in
Sulaymaniyah. 16 September 2017.
58. Barzani’s speech in Duhok’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Duhok,
16 September 2017.
59. Barzani’s message to the rally of the Kurdish diaspora in Washington DC. 17 Septem-
ber 2017.
60. Barzani’s meeting with Michael Fallon, US Secretary of State for Defence. Salahadin,
Erbil, 18 September 2017.
61. Barzani’s speech in Soran’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Soran,
Erbil, 19 September 2017.
62. Barzani’s interview with BBC Persian. 19 September 2017.
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63. Barzani’s speech in Sulaymaniyah’s rally in support of the independence referendum.
Sulaymaniyah, 20 September 2017.
64. Statement of the High Referendum Council. Salahadin, Erbil, 21 September 2017.
65. Barzani’s interview with Voice of America’s Persian Service. 21 September 2017.
66. Barzani’s interview with the Guardian. 22 September 2017.
67. Barzani’s last speech in Erbil’s rally in support of the independence referendum. Erbil,
22 September 2017.
68. Barzani’s press conference on the independence referendum. Salahadin, Erbil, 24 Sep-
tember 2017.
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